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CHILD SEX ABUSE VICTIMS: HOW WILL THEIR STORIES BE
HEARD AFTER CRAWFORD v. WASHINGTON?
INTRODUCTION
Christa Nester, a state prosecutor and child advocate, is working
with seventeen-year-old Alice, who has been sexually abused by her
father for approximately ten years. Alice is very fearful of testifying
face-to-face against her father. Ms. Nester has videotaped interviews
with Alice, the social worker, and other prosecutors where Alice explic-
itly describes the abuse. Since Alice's allegation, five other identified
victims have refused to testify, including Alice's older sister Bonnie.
Pursuant to a recent United States Supreme Court decision, Crawford
v. Washington, Ms. Nester is unable to admit these videotapes or the
testimony of the social worker, regardless of a judicial determination
of reliability. This case, decided in March 2004, purported to protect
the defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation and declared
that testimonial hearsay is inadmissible unless the victim is unavaila-
ble and there was prior opportunity for the defendant to cross-examine
the witness.1 Ms. Nester and other prosecutors now face the difficult
task of advocating for child victims after this decision.
This comment focuses on the Confrontation Clause's interpreta-
tion throughout history and demonstrates the adverse effects the cur-
rent state of the law has on child sex abuse victims like Alice and
Bonnie. As such, the United States Supreme Court should declare that
current statutory protections for child sex abuse victims are valid
exceptions to the Confrontation Clause. Additionally, states should be
encouraged to establish these statutes where they do not exist.
BACKGROUND
Historical Underpinnings of the Confrontation Clause
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the
defendant the right to confront his accuser face-to-face at trial.2 The
origin of the Sixth Amendment dates back to the age of the Roman
1. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witness against him; to have compulsory process
279
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Empire.3 In Coy v. Iowa, the Court quoted Acts 25:16, "It is not the
manner of the Romans to deliver any man up to die before the accused
has met his accusers face to face, and has been given a chance to
defend himself against the charges."4 Similarly, in Sir Walter Raleigh's
trial for high treason, he attempted to call his accuser Lord Cobnam, to
the trial with hopes of recantation. 5 When the prosecutor Sir Edward
Coke denied these repeated requests, Raleigh proclaimed:
But it is strange to see how you press me still with my Lord Cobnam,
and yet will not produce him... [H]e is in the house hard by, and may
soon be brought hither; let him be produced, and if he will yet accuse
me or avow this confession of his, it shall convict me and ease you of
further proof.
6
This was one of the most well-known trials of its time and is given
the credit for the early English statutory reforms involving confronta-
tion.7 This unjust system of government faced by Sir Walter Raleigh
caused great fear in the minds of the Framers and influenced the Sixth
Amendment's right of confrontation.8
Adoption of the Sixth Amendment
While the historical underpinnings are important when discern-
ing the intent of the Framers, it is imperative to explore the adoption of
the Sixth Amendment and its interpretation throughout case law in
order to establish its purpose and intricacies. The Sixth Amendment
reads in part, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him ... and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." 9
According to one commentator, the Confrontation Clause received
little attention during the constitutional debates, which resulted in the
adoption of the Bill of Rights. 10 The Supreme Court first passed down
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.") (emphasis added).
3. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43.
4. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015-016 (1988).
5. Penny J. White, Rescuing the Confrontation Clause, 54 S.C. L. REV. 537, 542
(2003).
6. Id. at 542-43.
7. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
8. White, supra note 5, at 542.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
10. Carol A. Chase, The Five Faces of the Confrontation Clause, 40 Hous. L. REv.
1003, 1004-05 (2003) (stating "[these] eighteen words .... collectively referred to as
the Confrontation Clause, found their way into the Sixth Amendment with almost no
notice").
280 [Vol. 27:279
2
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol27/iss2/5
CHILD SEX ABUSE VICTIMS
a decision interpreting the clause over a century later in 1895." Fur-
thermore, it was not held applicable to the states until 1965 when Jus-
tice Black stated in Pointer v. Texas, "the Sixth Amendment's right of
an accused to confront the witnesses against him is likewise a funda-
mental right and is made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment."'12
United States Supreme Court Decisions: Over 100 years of Precedent
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that the
Confrontation Clause is a fundamental right which ensures the relia-
bility of admissible evidence 13 and has repeatedly emphasized that this
fundamental right is not absolute.' 4 For 100 years, the Court allowed
deviations from the strict text of the Sixth Amendment in order to pro-
mote public policy and to accommodate the necessities of the cases.
15
Previous Precedent: Ohio v. Roberts
The Court's decision in Ohio v. Roberts gave future judges and
justices an analytical template to use when deciphering whether cer-
tain hearsay should be admitted into evidence. 16 The Court held that
when a declarant was found to be "unavailable," his statement was
only admissible when it bore adequate "indicia of reliability," meaning
the statement either fell into a firmly-rooted hearsay exception or
showed particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 17 State legisla-
tures relied on this framework when drafting legislation for protection
11. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
12. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
13. See Mattox, 156 U.S. 237; Pointer, 380 U.S. 400; Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S.
836 (1990).
14. See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243 ("General rules of this kind, however beneficent in
their operation and valuable to the accused must occasionally give way to
considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case .... The law, in its
wisdom, declares that the rights of the public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order
that an incidental benefit may be preserved to the accused."); Dowdell v. United
States, 221 U.S. 325, 330-31 (1911) (affirming that the Confrontation Clause has
always have "certain well-recognized exceptions"); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.
284, 295 (1973) ("Of course, the right to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute
and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the
criminal trial process.")
15. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243.
16. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), overruled by Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
17. Id.
20051
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of child sex abuse victims, adult victims and mentally infirm adult
crime victims.18
The Court affirmed its decision in Roberts when it was confronted
with a child sex abuse situation in the 1988 decision, Coy v. Iowa. 9
This decision, written by Justice Scalia, found that by placing a screen
between a defendant and a child in a child sex abuse case violated the
defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation right.20 In the discus-
sion of the case, Scalia conceded that:
We have in the past indicated that rights conferred by the Confronta-
tion Clause are not absolute.. .We leave for another day, however, the
question whether any exceptions exist. Whatever they may be, they
would surely be allowed only when necessary to further public policy.2 1
The court held that denying this particular defendant a face-to-
face cross examination opportunity violated his Sixth Amendment
rights and created a high threshold for future cases in determining
whether a child can legally testify through a medium that substituted
the face-to-face cross-examination.22
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor emphasized the impor-
tance in recognizing that the Confrontation Clause is not absolute.23
"[Tihose rights are not absolute but rather may give way in an appro-
priate case to other competing interests so as to permit the use of cer-
tain procedural devices designed to shield a child witness from the
trauma of courtroom testimony. '24 Justice O'Connor wrote about the
increase of child abuse in today's society and emphasized "nothing in
[the Coy] decision necessarily dooms such efforts by state legislatures
to protect child witnesses. "25
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Coy took shape as a
majority opinion in Maryland v. Craig.26 This case involved a 6-year-
old victim of sex abuse who was likely to suffer severe emotional dis-
tress by seeing her perpetrator in the courtroom.2 7 O'Connor wrote
18. Chase, supra note 10, at 1020.
19. Coy, 487 U.S. 1012.
20. Id. at 1020.
21. Id. at 1020-021 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 1022.
23. Id.
24. Id. (emphasis added).
25. Id. at 1023.
26. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 849-50 (stating "though we reaffirm the importance of
face-to-face confrontation with witnesses appearing at trial, we cannot say that such
confrontation is an indispensable element of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the
right to confront one's accusers").
27. Id. at 836.
282 [Vol. 27:279
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that the Confrontation Clause does not guarantee an absolute right to
a face-to-face confrontation. 28 She reemphasized that the central pur-
pose of the clause is "to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a
defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in an adversary proceed-
ing before the trier of fact."' 29 Furthermore, the opinion stated that
public policy and the necessities of the case provide for exceptions and
that a state's interest in the child abuse victim's welfare can outweigh a
defendant's right to face his or her accusers in court.30
Crawford v. Washington, 2004: The Current State of the Law
Crawford's complexity requires a detailed examination in order to
understand the current state of the law and the necessity of the crea-
tion of an exception for child sex abuse victims. This decision over-
ruled prior precedent and created an absolute bar to testimonial
hearsay unless it is proven that the declarant is 1) unavailable and 2)
there was prior opportunity for cross-examination. 31 The Court's
rationale was to absolutely protect the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right of confrontation.32
In 1999, Michael D. Crawford was charged with assault and
attempted murder for the alleged stabbing of Kenneth Lee.33 Sylvia
Crawford, defendant's wife and witness to the incident, indicated that
the incident was not in self-defense in her tape-recorded interview with
a police officer. 34 Pursuant to the state of Washington's marital privi-
lege, Sylvia could not testify.35 The State introduced her tape-recorded
statement and Crawford objected on the grounds that its admission
would violate his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights.
36
After two appeals, the Supreme Court of Washington admitted the
statement concluding that the statement bore particularized guaran-
tees of trustworthiness and should be admitted under Roberts.37 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Confron-
tation Clause issue.38
28. Id. at 836-37.
29. Id. at 837.
30. Id.
31. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004).
32. Id. at 60.
33. Id. at 38.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 39.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 40.
38. Id. at 42.
20051 283
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Justice Scalia wrote a landmark decision overruling Ohio v. Rob-
erts and creating vast confusion over the admission of out-of-court
statements throughout the criminal law field. Justice Scalia found
Ohio v. Roberts too subjective and held the rule of law announced in
the decision allowed evidence to be admitted "untested by the adver-
sary process" and "based on a mere judicial determination of
reliability. 3
9
Justice Scalia's analysis implied that there first must be a determi-
nation of whether the statement seeking to be admitted is testimonial
or non-testimonial. 40 He failed to define "testimonial", however stated
at a minimum, the term covers "prior testimony at a preliminary hear-
ing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interroga-
tions. '"41 The opinion referred to an appellate brief written by the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae,
which suggested that testimonial statements are statements that a rea-
sonable witness would make in contemplation of trial.42 In general,
states have consistently considered co-defendants' statements to
police, prosecutors' interviews with defendants, and videotaped inter-
views and formal statements made by victims to the police to be testi-
monial and therefore invoking the defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights.43 In contrast, non-testimonial statements have generally only
included excited utterances, statements to undercover officers not in
contemplation of trial, statements to third parties, and co-conspirator
statements.44
39. Id. at 61.
40. Id. at 59, 68 ("Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been
admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine .... Where non-testimonial hearsay is at
issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in
their development of hearsay law.").
41. Id. at 68.
42. Id. at 52.
43. See Brooks v. State, 132 S.W.3d 702, 707 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004); United States v.
Saner, 313 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902 (S.D. Ind. 2004); People v. Zarazua, No. H025472,
2004 WL 837914, at *4 (Cal. App. 6th April 20, 2004); Moody v. State, 594 S.E.2d
350, 354 (Ga. 2004).
44. See People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 878 (2004); People v. Becerra, No.
G030893, 2004 WL 576246, at *7 (Cal. App. 4th March 24, 2004); People v. Coker,
No. 238738, 2004 WL 626855 (Mich. App. March 30, 2004); State v. Forrest, 596
S.E.2d 22, 27 (N.C. App. 2004); Cassidy v. State, 149 S.W.3d 712 (Tex. App. 2004);
United States v. Manfre, 368 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 2004); But see People v. Cortes, 2004
N.Y. Slip Op. 24185 (N.Y. 2004) (holding 911 calls were testimonial in nature).
[Vol. 27:279
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However a marked gray area exists between testimonial and non-
testimonial statements in cases involving children and sex abuse.45 In
People v. Geno, the Michigan appellate court held that a child's state-
ment to the executive director of a Child Assessment Center was non-
testimonial and therefore admissible in court.46  Conversely, in
Snowden v. State, a Maryland appellate court found statements made
by children to social workers about sexual abuse to be testimonial and
therefore not admissible without the requisite showing of unavailabil-
ity and a prior opportunity for cross examination.47 The court found
that the interview was in contemplation for trial because "the children
were interviewed for the expressed purpose of developing their testi-
mony by [the social worker]."48
Chief Justice Rehnquist stated in his concurrence in Crawford that
overruling Ohio v. Roberts "will cast a mantle of uncertainty over future
criminal trials in both federal and state courts, and is by no means
necessary to decide this present case."49 Commentators believed that
Ohio v. Roberts sought to accommodate two competing interests: "con-
frontation as a means of testing the reliability and accuracy of evidence
against the accused versus the need on occasion to admit hearsay evi-
dence to further effective law enforcement. '50 One hundred years of
precedent proves that the Confrontation Clause is not absolute and
that exceptions are allowed for the purpose of promoting public pol-
icy.5 Past Courts have determined that when drafting the Sixth
Amendment the Framers intended to ensure the reliability and truth-
fulness of evidence,52 consequently protecting both the defendant and
the victim's rights.
Pursuant to the Ohio v. Roberts5 3 decision, over 40 states passed
legislation that protected child abuse victims from seeing their offend-
ers in court by creating ways for their out-of-court statements to come
into evidence.5 4 The legislation proved necessary when statistics sur-
45. See People v. Geno, 683 N.W.2d 687 (Mich. App. 2004); But see Snowden v.
State, 846 A.2d 36 (Md. App. 2004).
46. Geno, 683 N.W.2d at 690.
47. Snowden, 846 A.2d at 47.
48. Id.
49. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (Rehnquist, Cj., concurring).
50. Chase, supra note 10, at 1044.
51. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
52. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973); Mattox, 156 U.S. 237.
53. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, overruled by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
54. See ALAsKA STAT. § 12.40.110 (1998); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1228 (1995); COLO.
REv. STAT. § 13-25-129 (1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2803.1 (1993) (other states
with these statutes include Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana,
2005]
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faced showing widespread child sex abuse and an inability to prose-
cute the offenders." In 1983, about ten years after child abuse
awareness began, the Department of Health and Human Services esti-
mated 72,000 children were being sexually abused by their parents,
guardians, and persons in their household, while only ten percent of
those were able to be prosecuted successfully due to a of lack of evi-
dence and child trauma. 6 In 1998, the American Academy of Child &
Adolescent Psychiatry reported that there were 80,000 reported and
many more suspected incidents that remained unknown "because the
children are afraid to tell anyone what has happened, and the legal
procedure for validating an episode is difficult. '5 7 Previous precedent
allowed for statutes that protected child victim's rights allowing for
substitutions to face-to-face confrontation or allowing out of court tes-
timony when the court determines it to be reliable. However, these
statutes may now be determined to be unconstitutional under current
law.5
9
Overturned Convictions Under the Current State of the Law
Many child sex abuse convictions have been reversed since the
Crawford v. Washington decision. These cases demonstrate the diffi-
culty in prosecuting perpetrators under the current state of the law.
The facts of these cases demonstrate the importance of having excep-
tions for child victims who cannot competently testify due to their
young age and abject fear.
People v. Espinoza
A jury convicted Espinoza of sexually abusing a child based on
evidence from a medical examination at Valley Children's Hospital in
Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming).
55. Lynn H. Frank, Pennsylvania v. Ritchie: The Supreme Court Examines
Confrontation and Due Process in Child Abuse Cases, 34 Loy. L. REV 181, 186 (1988).
56. Id.
57. American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, No. 9, at http://
www.aacap.org/publications/factsfam/sexabuse.html, Last modified 11/98. (On file
with Campbell Law Review)
58. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-25-129 (2003) (stating that an out-of-court statement
made by a child sex abuse victim is admissible in evidence when the child either 1)
testifies, or 2) is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborative evidence of the act
which is the subject of the statement).
59. Michael S. Walsh, Joseph K. Scott III, Recent Development Criminal Law to Trust,
Estate, 52 LA. B. J. 38, (2004).
286 [Vol. 27:279
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Fresno.60 The emergency room doctor found tears, scars, thinness and
lesions in the child victim's rectum consistent with sexual abuse.6 1
There was so much swelling, scarring and healing that the doctor con-
cluded that there had been multiple incidents of abuse.6 2 The child's
rectum was larger than "it should have been" and it was possible that
the abuse could have occurred as recently as that day.6 3
During the exam, Espinoza's victim would not disclose any infor-
mation to the doctor. 64 However, later that day in a videotaped inter-
view with a Police Sergeant, the child victim gave specific details about
the abuse and identified the defendant as the perpetrator.65 On the
day of trial, the child victim was determined to be "unavailable" to tes-
tify pursuant to California statute, and the State admitted the video-
tape into evidence in lieu of the child's testimony.6 6
The jury found the defendant guilty of four counts of aggravated
sexual assault for the forcible sodomy of the child victim who was less
than fourteen years of age and over ten years younger than defendant.
The defendant was also found guilty of committing a lewd or lascivi-
ous act upon another child victim, the defendant's daughter, and sen-
tenced to 75 years to life in state prison.6 7 The defendant appealed his
convictions to the appellate court in California.6" Based on Crawford,
the court vacated the four counts of aggravated sexual assault against
the child victim, upholding only the defendant's conviction for "com-
mitting lewd or lascivious acts" upon his daughter.6 9
People v. Vigil
In this case, a father went to his son's bedroom to check on his 7-
year-old son when he saw the defendant leaning over the child. 70 Both
the defendant and the son were partially undressed and the son told
his father that the defendant had "stuck his winkie in his butt and his
butt hurt. '71 He also told another visitor in the home that his bottom
60. People v. Espinoza, No. H026266, 204 WL 1560376, at *1 (Cal. App. 6th July
13, 2004).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1-2.
66. Id. at 5.
67. Id. at 1.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. People v. Vigil, 104 P.3d 258, 261 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
71. Id.
20051 287
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was sore.72 The trial court found that the son was incompetent to tes-
tify at trial and permitted the State to enter a videotaped interview
between policeman and the victim into evidence.73
Under Roberts, the court allowed the videotaped interview
because the corroborating evidence ensured "particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness." There were two witnesses and there was a state-
ment of the victim in an environment without the presence of the per-
petrator that was consistent with that of the witnesses. In addition,
after the incident the defendant told the police and that he had "done
bad" and stabbed himself. 74 The defendant then repeated this confes-
sion to the emergency room personnel.75
A jury convicted Vigil of sexual assault on a child and found him
to be a habitual sex offender.76 On appeal, the court reversed the con-
viction because the admission of the victim's videotaped interview vio-
lated his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights.77 The court
determined that this interview was taken in anticipation of trial and
that it was testimonial in nature. 78 Because the defendant had no prior
opportunity to cross-examine the child, the appellate court followed
Crawford and held the videotape was inadmissible.79
In the Interest of R.A.S.
The juvenile respondent in this case was convicted for touching
the genitals of a four-year-old victim and forcing the victim to perform
oral sex on him.8 0 The mother of the victim walked into their living
room, heard the juvenile pull up his pants and then heard the victim
say "he made me suck his pee pee."8 1 The victim subsequently told his
grandmother that the juvenile made him "lick" and "suck" his genita-
lia. 2 An investigator conducted a videotaped interview with the vic-
tim, and the tape was subsequently admitted into evidence.8 3 On
appeal, the court found that the interview was "testimonial" and
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 262.
79. Id. at 264-65.
80. In the Interest of R.A.S., No. 03CA1209, 2004 WL 1351383, at *1 (Colo. App.
June 17, 2004).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
[Vol. 27:279288
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reversed and remanded the case because there had been no prior
opportunity for cross-examination. 4
Snowden v. State
Based on the ground that his confrontation rights were violated,
the defendant appealed convictions for seven counts of child abuse
and related offenses.8 5 In the first trial, before the Crawford decision,
testimony of a licensed social worker was admitted pursuant to a Mary-
land statute.8 6 Each of three female victims alleged that the defendant
touched them improperly in their genitalia and breast areas.8 7 The
appellate court reversed and remanded the case, declaring statements
to the social worker testimonial because the interview was for "the
expressed purpose of developing their testimony" by the social
worker.88 Under the current law, the State will have to prove on
remand that each of the children are unavailable to testify and that the
defendant had prior opportunity to cross-examine each child in order
for the interview to be admitted into evidence without the children tes-
tifying at trial.8 9
People v. Sisavath
Defendant was convicted of 10 counts of child sexual abuse
including forcible lewd acts, aggravated child sexual assault, forcible
rape and forcible sexual penetration. 90 On appeal the California court
of appeals reversed and remanded in part, finding that admitting the
victims' testimony to the police was unconstitutional under Crawford v.
Washington.91 Two children each told their mother that defendant,
their mother's acquaintance, had "touched [their] private parts".
92
Their mother called the police and after an investigation, there was
evidence of numerous incidents of child abuse.93
In order to convict the alleged perpetrator on remand, the State
will have to give the defendant prior opportunity to cross examine the
victims and prove that the victims are unavailable. 94
84. Id. at 5.
85. Snowden v. State, 846 A.2d 36, 42 (Md. Ct. App. 2004).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 47.
89. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
90. People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 755 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
91. Id. at 757.
92. Id. at 755.
93. Id.
94. See Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
2892005]
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Statistics
The reversal of the above convictions and the difficulty of prose-
cuting future cases will affect society as a whole. An estimated 10% of
all boys and 25% of all girls in the United States are sexually abused. 95
Long-term symptoms of sexual abuse include anxiety, depression, sui-
cidal thoughts, sexual anxiety, low self-esteem, greater propensity for
unhealthy habits such as alcohol abuse, drug abuse, self-mutilation, or
bingeing and purging.96 The prosecution of child sex crimes becomes
increasingly difficult because young children lose memory, trauma-
tized children block memory, and victims blame themselves.9 7 The
director of the American Prosecutors Research Institute's National
Child Protection Training Center is concerned about the effect the
Crawford decision will have on mentally retarded children and young
children, like Alice and Bonnie, who are unable to testify under oath.98
The director said, "without in-court, under-oath testimony Crawford
will exclude many child hearsay statements."99 He further stated that
the recent United States Supreme Court decision is causing many pros-
ecutors to 'throw in the towel'. 100
Proposal
In order to prevent the 'throw in the towel' mentality, the United
States Supreme Court should distinguish their holding in Crawford v.
Washington and declare that statutory exceptions to face-to-face con-
frontation as applied to child sex abuse victims are constitutional.
Column I in table I below represents an example of a statute that seeks
to protect the unavailable child victim while demanding other forms of
evidence in order to ensure the reliability of evidence.' 01 The com-
ments in column II of Table I describe the effects that the Crawford
decision will have on these statutes.
95. Julia Whealin, Ph.D., Child Sexual Abuse, A National Center for PTSD, Fact
Sheet at http://www.ncptsd.org/facts/specific/fs-child_sexual-abuse.html.
96. Id.
97. See Kibret Markos. Young Victims' Short Memories Complicate Child-Abuse
Cases. NJ. RECORD. Aug. 2, 2004, at 1, available at 2004 WLNR 3228349.
98. Wendy N. Davis, Hearsay, Gone Tomorrow?, 22 A.B.A. J., Sept., 2004.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 11 § 3513 (2003).
290 [Vol. 27:279
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TABLE I
DELAWARE CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 11, PART II, CHAPTER 35.
EFFECT ON STATUTE AFTER
CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON
§ 3513 Hearsay exception for child victim's or
witnesses out-of-court statement of abuse.
Exceptions will only be allowed when
the statement is determined to be
non-testimonial. If statement is non-
testimonial, "it is consistent with the
framers' design to afford the states
flexibility in their development of
hearsay law."
1 0 2
If statement is determined to be testi-
monial, declarant must be 1) unavail-
able and 2) defendant must have had
prior opportunity to cross-examine
the witness. 
1 0 3
(a) An out-of-court statement made by a child
victim or witness who is under 11 years of age
at the time of the proceeding concerning an act
that is a material element of the offense relating
to sexual abuse, physical injury, serious physical
injury, death, abuse or neglect as described in
any felony delineated in subpart A, B or D of
subchapter II of Chapter 5 of this title, or in any
of the felonies delineated in § 782, 783, 783A,
1102, 1108, 1109, 1111 or 1112A of this title
or in any attempt to commit any felony deline-
ated in this paragraph that is not otherwise
admissible in evidence is admissible in any judi-
cial proceeding if the requirements of subsec-
tions (b)-(f) of this section are met.
(b) An out-of-court statement may be admitted
as provided in subsection (a) of this section if:
(1) The child is present and the child's tes- If child is testifying, Confrontation
timony touches upon the event and is sub- Clause violation is not at issue.
ject to cross-examination rendering such
prior statement admissible under § 3507 of
this tide; or
(2)a. The child is found by the court to be These factors are used by the courts
unavailable to testify on any of these to determine whether the child declar-
grounds: ant is unavailable.
1. The child's death;
2. The child's absence from the juris-
diction;
102. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
103. Id.
2005]
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DELAWARE CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 11, PART II, CHAPTER 35.
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EFFECT ON STATUTE AFTER
CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON
3. The child total failure of memory;
4. The child persistent refusal to testify
despite judicial requests to do so;
5. The child physical or mental disabil-
ity;
6. The existence of a privilege involv-
ing the child;
7. The child's incompetency, including
the child's inability to communicate
about the offense because of fear or a
similar reason; or
8. Substantial likelihood that the child
would suffer severe emotional trauma
from testifying at the proceeding or by
means of a videotaped deposition or
closed-circuit television; and
2(b) The child's out-of-court statement is
shown to possess particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness.
(c) A finding of unavailability under subsection
(b) (2)a.8. of this section must be supported by
expert testimony.
(d) The proponent of the statement must inform
the adverse party of the proponent's intention to
offer the statement and the content of the state-
ment sufficiently in advance of the proceeding
to provide the adverse party with a fair opportu-
nity to prepare a response to the statement
before the proceeding at which it is offered.
(e) In determining whether a statement pos-
sesses particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness under subsection (b)(2) of this section, the
court may consider, but is not limited to, the
following factors:
(1) The child's personal knowledge of the
event;
(2) The age and maturity of the child;
(3) Certainty that the statement was made,
including the credibility of the person testi-
fying about the statement;
(4) Any apparent motive the child may have
to falsify or distort the event, including
bias, corruption or coercion;
(5) The timing of the child statement;
(6) Whether more than 1 person heard the
statement;
(7) Whether the child was suffering pain or
distress when making the statement;
(8) The nature and duration of any alleged
abuse;
Overruled by Crawford v. Washing-
ton. If the statement is determined to
be testimonial, the second criterion of
the analysis is prior opportunity for
the defendant to cross-examine the
witness, no matter how reliable the
statement. 104
The "Particularized Guarantees of
Trustworthiness" criterion has been
overruled; Crawford v. Washington
held these factors were too "amor-
phous" and "subjective".
104. Id. at 63.
292
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TITLE 11, PART II, CHAPTER 35. CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON
(9) Whether the child's young age makes it
unlikely that the child fabricated a state-
ment that represents a graphic, detailed
account beyond the child's knowledge and
experience;
(10) Whether the statement has a "ring of
verity," has internal consistency or coher-
ence and uses terminology appropriate to
the child's age;
(11) Whether the statement is spontaneous
or directly responsive to questions;
(12) Whether the statement is suggestive
due to improperly leading questions;
1Io
(f) The court shall support with findings on the Unconstitutional
record any rulings pertaining to the child's
unavailability and the trtworthiness of the
out-of-court statement.
At a minimum, a portion of state statutes such as Delaware's in
Table I above, will now be unconstitutional. The analysis in the right
column demonstrates which portions of the statute will be overruled
pursuant to Crawford.1°7
If there were a specific determination that this statutory exception
for child sex abuse is constitutional, Ms. Nester would have a chance at
convicting Alice's father. However without this determination, por-
tions of state statutes such as Delaware's will be unconstitutional when
statements are determined to be testimonial.' 08 Furthermore, states
that currently do not have such statutes in place will be unable to
adopt them in order to protect their child victims.
ARGUMENT
Precedent and Public Policy Allow for these Exceptions
Throughout history the United States Supreme Court has tried to
balance two very important sets of fundamental rights: those of vic-
tims and those of defendants. 10 9 Justice Scalia contends that the cases
since Mattox have
remained faithful to the Framers' understanding: Testimonial state-
ments of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where
105. Id. at 36.
106. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 11 § 3513 (2003) (emphasis added).
107. See Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
108. Id.
109. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a
prior opportunity to cross-examine.' 11
In general, this presumption is correct. However, history recog-
nizes that the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation is a fundamen-
tal right and that face-to-face confrontation is the preferred method of
cross-examination."1 However, it is important to emphasize that the
Confrontation Clause is not absolute and there are situations where
exceptions should exist for "necessities of the case" and for the further-
ance of public policy. 112 Before Crawford, a very low percentage of sex
abuse cases were successfully prosecuted." 3 After Crawford, and after
the statutory exceptions are declared unconstitutional, that percentage
will become even lower.
Alice and Bonnie
Alice and Bonnie's story is based on a real life incident that
occurred in Raleigh, North Carolina. An abuser had been terrorizing
several young girls for over a decade before he was finally brought to
justice in August of 2004."' The district attorney interviewed a total
of six victims, but only two testified at trial." 5 The two victims were
sisters and their father was the defendant." 6 The youngest victim,
now 17, gave birth to her father's child. 1 7 The district attorney
reported that the other victims admitted that the defendant had sexu-
ally abused them. However, when the time came for trial, they were
too emotional and vulnerable to actually take the witness stand and
testify in the defendant's presence.""
Under Crawford, if the victims had explained in great detail the
abuse to the prosecutor on videotape or had poured their heart out to a
social worker during a period of counseling, neither videotape would
be admissible as a substitution for the children's testimony. As a
result, if all six victims had been emotionally incapable of testifying in
front of the defendant, the decade-long molester would have walked
free.
110. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59.
111. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284 (1973).
112. Mattox, 156 U.S. 237.
113. Frank, supra note 56, at 186.
114. Andrea Weigl. Few Incest Victims Report It or Testify. THE NEws & OBSERVER.
Aug. 8, 2004, at 1.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
294 [Vol. 27:279
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On the other hand, if Crawford had not drawn such a rigid line,
statutory provisions would protect these six victims by offering them
other options, such as closed circuit television testimony and admissi-
bility of their interviews based on other reliability factors, such as cor-
roborating evidence (i.e.: the DNA results of the daughter's child).
Justice Scalia maintains that the "Framers would be astounded to
learn that ex parte testimony could be admitted against a criminal
defendant because it was elicited by 'neutral' government officers.
'
"119
However, other members of the court recognize that "exceptions to
confrontation have always been derived from the experience that some
out-of-court statements are just as reliable as cross-examined in-court
testimony due to the circumstances under which they were made.'
120
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Coy v. Iowa and in her majority
opinions in Maryland v. Craig and Idaho v. Wright support the argu-
ment that exceptions to the Confrontation Clause must be allowed.
Justice O'Connor has recognized the need for a realistic viewpoint on
child sex abuse and the Confrontation Clause. 121 Her opinions
demonstrate the ability to sufficiently protect a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation while still being sensitive to the
needs of the special victims of child sex abuse.
122
For example, in Maryland v. Craig, O'Connor led the majority in
the pursuit of substitute means of cross-examination.1 23 In this case,
the 6-year-old victim was determined to be so emotionally distraught
that "she could not communicate effectively.' 24 The court found that
she qualified for a Maryland statutory procedure, which allowed a
judge to receive the testimony of the child by a one-way closed circuit
television. 125 The procedure allows for the prosecutor, the victim and
the defense counsel to be in one room while the jury, the judge and the
defendant are in a different room hearing the direct and cross exami-
nations. 126 The goal of this procedure is to allow the child to give her
119. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 66 (2004).
120. Id. at 74 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring) (emphasis added).
121. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) ("[W]e have never insisted on an
actual face-to-face encounter at trial in every instance in which testimony is admitted
against a defendant. Instead, we have repeatedly held that the Clause permits, where
necessary, the admission of certain hearsay statements against the defendant despite
the defendant's inability to confront the declarant at trial.").
122. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 853; Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822 (1990).
123. See Craig, 497 U.S. 836.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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testimony without having to look at his/her perpetrator. 127 However,
the defendant's counsel gets to fully cross-examine the child and
remain in contact via electronic communications with the defen-
dant. 128 In this opinion, the majority reiterated that the Confrontation
Clause is not absolute and "in certain narrow circumstances, compet-
ing interests, if 'closely examined,' may warrant dispensing with con-
frontation at trial."'129 Likewise, the majority concluded that "a State's
interest in the physical and psychological well-being of child abuse vic-
tims may be sufficiently important to outweigh, at least in some cases,
a defendant's right to face his or her accusers in court." 130 The major-
ity continues by recognizing that there is a widespread belief in the
importance of this public policy, consequently a significant majority
of states have enacted statutes specifically aimed at protecting child
sex abuse victims.' 3 '
Statutory Exceptions Would Adequately Protect a Defendant's Sixth
Amendment Rights.
An analysis of the North Carolina case mentioned above demon-
strates how statutes such as Delaware's protect the rights of both the
victim and the defendant. Assume the two daughters from this case,
Alice and Bonnie, are not emotionally capable of testifying against
their father like the other four victims. Before the trial, the prosecutor
interviewed each girl separately in preparation for her direct examina-
tion. In the videotaped interviews, the girls each tell consistent stories
of the traumatic events over the past 10 years and continue to refuse to
testify. The issue is whether the statement would have been admissible
pursuant to statutes such as Delaware's pre-Crawford.
The first step would be to determine if they were unavailable. In
this case, under Delaware Statute § 3213-(a)(2)(b)(8) the state would
have to determine the victims to have a substantial likelihood of suffer-
ing severe emotional trauma from testifying at the proceeding or by
means of a videotaped deposition or closed-circuit television. 132 In
addition, under section 2(c) the substantial likelihood of severe trauma
must be supported with expert testimony. 133
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 848.
130. Id. at 853.
131. Id.
132. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 11 § 3513 (2003).
133. Id.
[Vol. 27:279
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The second step requires an examination to ensure that Alice and
Bonnie's statements to the prosecutor withstand the particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness. The court would look at the totality of
the circumstances, including hearing evidence from the defense
regarding possible motives for the man's daughters to lie, the defen-
dant's arguments regarding leading questions, and the possibility of a
lack of corroborating evidence. The court would also hear evidence
from the prosecution regarding duration of the abuse, maturity of the
girls, consistency of their stories, and whether there is any extrinsic
evidence.13 4 In this case, a paternity test showing that Alice's father
was also the father of Alice's child would probably be sufficient cor-
roborating evidence to ensure the reliability of Alice's testimonial state-
ment to the police officer regarding the incest. If the court found that
it was reliable, the child's statement would have been admitted into
evidence. Conversely, if the evidence indicated that the stories were
inconsistent, fabricated because of some ulterior motive, or simply not
corroborated, the court would exclude the statement.
On the other hand, in Delaware after Crawford, the analysis of first
step has the same conclusion as it did before Crawford, but the analysis
of the second step would be extremely different. No matter what cor-
roborating or extrinsic evidence the prosecution may show, any state-
ments considered testimonial would not be admitted into evidence
unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had prior oppor-
tunity to cross examine the witness. 135 In this case, if the girls were
unable to testify, the only evidence available for the prosecution would
have been the paternity test result and any statements the prosecutor
could convince the court were non-testimonial. If the prosecution
decided to proceed to trial with only a single piece of evidence, the
paternity test, the defense would try to create a reasonable doubt in the
minds of the jurors about the accuracy of the test. In the closing state-
ment, the defendant may say, "there is no testimony, there are no wit-
nesses.. .only results of a paternity test that may have been incorrectly
understood because the daughter and the father have such similar
DNA."
In situations like Alice and Bonnie's, the state has a compelling
interest to protect the psychological and physical well being of child
victims who are unable to protect themselves. 136 This includes emo-
tional protection by not putting them in severely traumatic situations
and physical protection by prosecuting their perpetrators. Under cur-
134. Id.
135. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
136. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982).
29720051
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rent law, the only solutions are to 1) plead to the court that the state-
ment is non-testimonial 13 7 or 2) continue investigations in order to
find other evidence.
Currently, protecting child victims is an impossible task. Statu-
tory provisions, which allowed for a judicial determination of reliabil-
ity, were the best way for the state to protect these interests. The
United States Supreme Court should distinguish Crawford v. Washing-
ton and allow for statutes protecting child sex abuse victims from fur-
ther trauma. These are precisely the "public policy" situations and
"necessities of the case" for which the previous one hundred years of
precedent would allow. In addition, states which do not have such
statutes in place should adopt these statutes allowing for a child's out-
of-court statement after a judicial determination of reliability.
One could argue that children's propensity for lying rebuts the
argument for exceptions to the rule pronounced in Crawford. In Coy,
for instance, Justice Scalia contends, "face-to-face presence . ..may
confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a
malevolent adult."' 3 8 However, it is also well accepted that children
"cannot sustain the lie through hundreds of hours of interviews with
police officers, doctors, social workers, relatives, and prosecutors." '139
Ultimately, prevaricating children will never make it to the point of
trial. In addition, statistics show that there is no nexus between hon-
esty and age and that children's ability to remember real events is
"quite accurate. '"140 Furthermore, descriptions of sexual abuse have
been proven to be as credible as recounts of any other crime.' 4 ' The
statutory exceptions proposed provide additional safeguards to protect
against deception by having a detailed consideration of the trustwor-
thiness of the testimony.
Other Options for Victims
Other possibilities, like closed circuit television in Maryland v.
Craig, were not directly overruled in Crawford.'42 In fact, some schol-
ars believe that the Crawford decision will encourage states to pass
137. See People v. Geno, 683 N.W.2d 687 (Mich. App. 2004) (concluding that a
statement, made to the executive director of Children's Assessment Center, not to a
government employee, was not ex parte in-court testimony nor its functional
equivalent therefore it is non-testimonial).
138. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020.
139. Frank, supra note 56, at 195-96.
140. Eleanor L. Owen, The Confrontation Clause Applied to Minor Victims of Sexual
Abuse, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1511, 1528 (1989).
141. Id.
142. See Craig, 497 U.S. 836.
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more laws allowing children to testify by closed circuit television.' 43
Hopefully, this theory will be correct and the current statutes will be
upheld and even more will be created. However, Justice Scalia's deci-
sion in Crawford mandated a technical adherence to the literal interpre-
tation of the Sixth Amendment, which may indicate future
requirements of a face-to-face confrontation with no exceptions, not
even for child sex abuse cases.144
CONCLUSION
It is human nature to become enraged when hearing about these
heinous acts and imagining the child predators roaming free. How-
ever, it is not all about emotion and feeling; one hundred years of pre-
cedent demonstrates that the Confrontation Clause is not absolute and
that exceptions were intended. Since hearing the first case to interpret
it, the Court has recognized the exceptions and allowed them for
"necessities of the case" and in promotion of public policy. There has
been emphasis on 1) the right of Confrontation being fundamental, 2)
the right not being absolute and 3) the core concern of the Clause
being the admissibility of truthful, reliable testimony. In the 1970s,
the recognition of child sex abuse began and by the eighties, the abuse
was found to be pervasive. In 1980, Justice Blackmun, author of Ohio
v. Roberts, realized that society was evolving and that the Framers
would have intended the Clause to respond to changing conditions.'4 5
In the Roberts opinion, the majority created a strict framework that
allowed states to have flexibility in determining exceptions as long as
there was an "indicia of reliability". In 1982, Globe Newspapers recog-
nized that the state has a compelling interest in the welfare of a child.
Later that decade, Coy and Craig confronted the experiments that sub-
stituted face-to-face cross-examinations with closed circuit television.
These cases, although they had different outcomes, each recognized
that exceptions to the Confrontation Clause were allowed to in order to
further public policy.
However, Crawford v. Washington has slowed the progress being
made on behalf of the nation's child victims. In these cases, the
"unavailability" prong of the analysis is usually met because child vic-
tims are vulnerable and will usually be emotionally incapable to testify
against their perpetrators. However, the second prong will rarely be
143. David L. Hudson Jr., New Clout for Confrontation Clause, 17 A.B.A. J. E-Report,
Apr. 30, 2004 at 1, available at http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/.
144. See Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
145. See Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, overruled by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
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met and the difficulty of prosecuting child predators will continue to
increase.
In conclusion, the United States Supreme Court should declare
that current statutes that allow statements made by child victims are
constitutional. In addition, states that do not have statutory excep-
tions are encouraged to create those exceptions for the purpose of fur-
thering public policy. Without these statutes, a child sex abuse
victim's story may never be heard.
Erin Thompson
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